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ABSTRACT. Despite a rich literature on the political and constitutional development of the Canadian territorial North, few 
scholars have examined the post-devolution environment in Yukon. This lacuna is surprising since devolution is frequently 
cited as being crucial to the well-being of Northerners, leading both the Government of Nunavut and the Government of the 
Northwest Territories to lobby the federal government to devolve lands and resources to them. This paper provides an updated 
historical account of devolution in Yukon and assesses its impact on the territory since 2003. Relying mainly on written 
sources and 16 interviews with Aboriginal, government, and industry officials in the territory, it highlights some broad effects 
of devolution and specifically analyzes the processes of obtaining permits for land use and mining. Our findings suggest that 
devolution has generally had a positive effect on the territory, and in particular has led to more efficient and responsive land 
use and mining permit processes. 
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RÉSUMÉ. Malgré le grand nombre de publications au sujet du développement politique et constitutionnel du Nord territorial 
canadien, peu d’érudits ont étudié la période ayant suivi le transfert des responsabilités au Yukon. Cette lacune surprend car 
le transfert des responsabilités est souvent cité comme étant crucial au bien-être des gens du Nord, ce qui a incité tant le 
gouvernement du Nunavut que celui des Territoires du Nord-Ouest à exercer des pressions sur le gouvernement fédéral en vue 
du transfert des terres et des ressources. Cet article présente l’historique actualisé du transfert des responsabilités au Yukon et 
évalue ses incidences sur le territoire depuis 2003. Il s’appuie principalement sur des sources écrites et sur 16 entrevues avec 
des Autochtones, des représentants des gouvernements et des représentants d’industries du territoire pour mettre en évidence 
certains effets à grande échelle du transfert des responsabilités et analyser plus précisément les processus d’obtention de 
permis en vue de l’utilisation des terres et de l’exploitation minière. Nos constatations suggèrent que le transfert des responsa-
bilités a eu des effets favorables sur le territoire et qu’il a mené à des processus d’établissement de permis plus efficaces et plus 
responsables en matière d’utilisation des terres et d’exploitation minière. 
Mots clés : transfert des responsabilités, territoire du Yukon, utilisation des terres, permis d’exploitation minière
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the North has become a highly sali-
ent region for academics, policy makers, and the general 
public in Canada. Historians and policy makers have spent 
considerable time examining our country’s claims to Arc-
tic sovereignty in the region (Coates et al., 2008). Scien-
tists have studied the Canadian Arctic to understand the 
consequences of climate change (e.g., Martin et al., 2007). 
Industry and government officials have put great effort 
into exploring and exploiting the many non-renewable 
resource deposits that were previously inaccessible because 
of harsh weather conditions and technological constraints 
(Hoefer, 2009:407 – 408). Scholars in the humanities and 
social sciences have also spent significant time in the area, 
examining the variety of indigenous land claims and inno-
vative self-government initiatives that have emerged there 
(Henderson, 2007; White, 2008; Alcantara and Whitfield, 
2010). Finally, researchers have long been interested in the 
political and constitutional maturation of the Canadian 
North, with a particular focus on how devolution has trans-
formed the territories into quasi-provinces with signifi-
cant powers and resources (Cameron and Campbell, 2009; 
Dacks, 1990; McArthur, 2009; White, 2009; Alcantara, 
2012).
Despite this rich and varied literature (see also Abele 
et al., 2009), scholars have yet to describe and analyze the 
impact of a number of important and recent developments 
relating to territorial devolution in the Canadian North. 
In particular, the Government of Yukon in 2003 achieved 
what no other territorial government has yet been able to 
achieve: jurisdiction over territorial lands and resources. 
Two landmark agreements in 1993 and 2001 facilitated this 
transfer. The first was the Umbrella Final Agreement (UFA) 
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signed by the Government of Canada, the Council of Yukon 
Indians (now, the Council of Yukon First Nations), and the 
Yukon government on 29 May 1993. The UFA provides the 
framework within which each of the 14 Yukon First Nations 
could conclude final land-claim agreements. The UFA 
addresses a number of topics, including land ownership, 
compensation moneys, self-government, and the estab-
lishment of boards, committees, and tribunals to ensure 
the joint management of a number of specific areas. With 
regard to devolution of lands and resources specifically, the 
UFA is important because it establishes formal representa-
tion for Yukon First Nations on the Yukon Environmental 
and Socio-Economic Assessment Board (YESAB), one of 
the joint management bodies created by the UFA and a cru-
cial component of the land use and mining permit processes 
in Yukon since devolution.
The second agreement is the Yukon Northern Affairs 
Program Devolution Transfer Agreement (DTA), which 
was signed by the Government of Canada and the Yukon 
government on 29 October 2001 and came into effect in 
2003 (Yukon Government, 2001; CBC, 2003). With the 
signing of the DTA, the Yukon government became the 
only territorial government in the North to have adminis-
trative control over its lands and resources. As a result of 
this agreement, the federal government of Canada relin-
quished to the Yukon government legislative authority 
over territorial lands and associated surface and subsurface 
resources such as forestry and minerals. The transfer also 
included jurisdiction over Yukon waters, as well as owner-
ship of many federal properties, assets, and contracts relat-
ing to what is now called the Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development’s Northern Affairs Pro-
gram (NAP) in the territory (Yukon Government, 2001). 
Commentators at the time hailed the DTA as an impor-
tant milestone for the constitutional and political develop-
ment of Yukon. Former Yukon Premier Dennis Fentie, for 
instance, said in 2003 that the DTA “will lead to positive 
changes for Yukon people. In the short term, the Yukon 
will acquire direct control over resource management—and 
thus the ability to respond quickly and effectively to issues 
as they arise. In the long term, Yukon people will gain a 
comprehensive and consistent management regime for for-
ests, lands, water and mining” (Fentie, 2003). To date, how-
ever, scholars have conducted very little empirical work on 
the effects of these developments. Thus, it is unclear what 
kind of impact these transfers of legislative administrative 
responsibility over Yukon lands and resources have had on 
advancing “good government” in the territory. 
This paper aims to address this lacuna by examining two 
normative claims frequently associated with devolution in 
general and with devolution specifically in the Canadian 
North. First, defenders of devolution argue that transferring 
power from the federal to the territorial government tends 
to improve government efficiency. Second, devolution is 
said to improve government responsiveness. Using primary 
and secondary sources and 16 semi-structured interviews 
with Aboriginal, territorial, and industry representatives 
(Table 1), we analyze these claims by focusing on the effect 
of the DTA and YESAB on the land use and mining permit 
processes in Yukon. Each representative was interviewed in 
person once for 30 to 90 minutes. 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Devolution is commonly characterized as an empirical 
phenomenon involving the transfer of powers and respon-
sibilities from the federal to the territorial governments 
(Clancy, 1990; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2002; Whitford, 
2002; Bradbury and Mitchell, 2005; Natcher and Davis, 
2007). However, the concept is also frequently analyzed and 
justified from a normative perspective (Rondinelli, 1980; 
Escobar-Lemmon, 2003; Smoke, 2003). Much of this nor-
mative literature tends to defend devolution by focusing on 
two interrelated benefits. The first is that devolution fosters 
more efficient governance practices because sub-national 
authorities are better positioned to access and make use of 
local knowledge and context. As a result, territorial govern-
ments can more efficiently gather information, design pol-
icy, and implement it (Rondinelli, 1980; Bukowski, 1997; 
De Vries, 2000; Escobar-Lemmon, 2003). Efficiency gains 
are also realized because sub-national governments can 
carry out these functions more quickly than a higher level 
of government can. For instance, research suggests that fed-
eral involvement in on-reserve land management in Canada 
tends to be much less efficient in terms of transaction times 
because of the geographic distance between the decision 
makers and the local community (Alcantara, 2005).
In many ways, this efficiency argument, in which sub-
national governments are better at identifying and deliv-
ering “the mix and level of services that their constituents 
need” (Smoke, 2003:9), is similar to the principle of sub-
sidiarity. This principle is best known for its articulation 
in Article 3b of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union 
(1993), which states that “the European Community can 
only take action in a concurrent policy field if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot sufficiently 
be achieved by the member states and can therefore, by rea-
son of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community” (Hueglin, 2007:202). Accord-
ing to Føllesdal (1998:190), the European principle of sub-
sidiarity is a normative vision of multilevel governance in 
which “powers or tasks should rest with the lower-level 
sub-units … unless allocating them to a higher-level central 
unit would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effec-
tiveness in achieving them.” 
A second major benefit of devolution is that it encour-
ages government responsiveness. When responsibility 
for territorial issues is located at the territorial rather than 
the federal level, local politicians and civil servants face 
stronger incentives and hold greater capacity to address the 
wide-ranging economic, and to some extent social, interests 
of their electorate. Territorial citizens are also more likely 
to monitor the actions of their political leaders and civil 
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servants (Hayek, 1945). In addition, devolution enhances 
responsiveness by ensuring that local issues no longer have 
to compete with the agendas of other sub-national and 
national units within the federation. Proponents of devolu-
tion suggest that making sub-national leaders responsible 
for sub-national decisions, removing local concerns from 
the national arena and placing them into the hands of ter-
ritorial actors, will ensure that decision makers are more in 
tune with and responsive to local needs (De Vries, 2000; 
Escobar-Lemon, 2003).
In short, proponents suggest that devolution is advan-
tageous because it improves government efficiency and 
responsiveness at the sub-national level. On the one hand, 
devolution encourages governance at the territorial level 
to be more efficient in terms of generating outcomes. On 
the other hand, devolution fosters increased government 
responsiveness, since territorial government actors are 
more likely to be sensitive to local concerns and contexts. 
YUKON DEVOLUTION: A HISTORY
The evolution of public government in Yukon took a 
tortuous path between the territory’s creation in 1898 and 
the implementation of the DTA in 2003. One of the most 
important advances occurred in 1908, the year a wholly 
elected territorial council, the term used then for a “legisla-
tive assembly,” was established. Prior to that time, the coun-
cil had comprised a mix of elected and federally appointed 
officials. Another major advance came a full 71 years later 
in 1979, with completion of the process for transferring all 
executive authorities of the Yukon government, in effect 
the Cabinet function, to individuals who had been elected 
to the territorial council. Through a letter of instruction 
from the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Devel-
opment, Jake Epp, then-Commissioner Ione Christensen 
was ordered to relinquish her executive powers. Prior to the 
Epp Letter, the powers of the Commissioner of the territory 
were similar to those normally associated with provincial 
premiers, whereas now the Commissioner is equivalent to 
a provincial lieutenant governor (Cameron and Gomme, 
1991). With the Commissioner no longer in charge of ter-
ritorial affairs, party politics and the Westminster system 
commonly enjoyed by the provinces were ushered in. Since 
that time, successive governments have resembled their 
provincial counterparts, operating under the principles of 
representative and responsible government (Cameron and 
White, 1995; Alcantara, 2012). 
The evolution of the structure of the Yukon govern-
ment was accompanied by the evolution of the substance 
of its governance business. From the creation of the territo-
rial government in 1898 through the 1950s, its jurisdiction 
largely covered social programming and subordinate gov-
ernment functions: what is normally referred to as munici-
pal government. While the devolution of formerly federal 
responsibilities to the Yukon government is not a new phe-
nomenon, the list of powers of the territorial government 
was quite minimal, and in no instance included jurisdiction 
on matters relating to ownership, administration, or con-
trol of land and resources. This pattern is consistent with 
the progress experienced in the early days of Saskatchewan 
and Alberta: provincial status did not change Crown own-
ership of land and resources. Transfer of power over land 
and resources to these provinces did not occur until 1930, 
a quarter-century after their creation in 1905 (Alcantara, 
2012).
After the Second World War, a series of programs 
directly related to Yukon residents was gradually trans-
ferred to the Yukon territorial government: certain health 
services, police and corrections services, maintenance 
of the Alaska Highway, and the administration of jus-
tice (Michael, 1987; Clancy, 1990; Beaubier and Beaubier, 
2002). These early transfers were necessitated by the grow-
ing population’s demand for enhanced government ser-
vices in the post-war years and “their variety underlined 
the increasingly complex character of the territorial govern-
ment in the era of the welfare state” (Clancy, 1990:22). It is 
worth noting, however, that the federal government at this 
TABLE 1. List of interviewees, Whitehorse Yukon. 
Name Title Date of Interview
S. Abercrombie Executive Director, Energy, Mines and Resources 19 November 2010
J. Colbert Official in the Yukon Government Lands Branch 17 November 2010
J. Cunning Former Principal Secretary to Premier Duncan 16 November 2010
G. Komaromi Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy, Mines and Resources 19 November 2010
D. Leas Legal counsel for the Council of Yukon First Nations 22 November 2010
B. Love Assistant Deputy Minister, Energy, Mines and Resources 19 November 2010
P. McDonald Former Premier of the Yukon Territory 15 November 2010
B. McIntyre Manager, Energy, Mines and Resources, Mineral Planning and Development Branch 18 November 2010
K. McKinnon Board member, YESAB1 23 November 2010
P. Muir Justice official, Yukon Government 19 November 2010
J. O’Farrell Deputy Minister, Community Services 15 November 2010
A. Robertson Deputy Minister, Energy, Mines and Resources 19 November 2010
S. Smyth Assistant Deputy Minister, Executive Council Office, Yukon Government 17 November 2010
B. Sproule Official in the Yukon Government Lands Branch 17 November 2010
M. Wark Executive Director, Yukon Chamber of Mines 17 November 2010
M. White Official in the Yukon Government Lands Branch 17 November 2010
1 YESAB = Yukon Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment Board
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time did not have a coherent policy regarding the transfer 
of such programs. The result is that the nascent process of 
devolution proceeded on a case-by-case basis and far too 
slowly for the tastes of many in Yukon. Moreover, those 
transfers that were completed focused more on decentral-
izing organizational capacity than on enhancing legislative 
authority (Clancy, 1990). 
With no law-making authority and only limited ability 
to determine the pace and scope of further program trans-
fers, the Yukon territorial government had no control over 
the devolution agenda, which remained firmly in the hands 
of the federal government. For instance, as part of a trans-
fer agreement signed in 1972, the federal Department of 
Fisheries agreed to devolve the administration and man-
agement of freshwater fisheries, the licensing of sport and 
commercial fishing, and the enforcement of fishing regula-
tions to the territorial government. However, over a period 
of two years, the federal government unilaterally revised 
the terms of the initial agreement and eventually reneged 
on its commitments under the original proposal. Faced with 
the prospect of walking away empty-handed, the territorial 
government reluctantly accepted the federal government’s 
modified proposal, which transferred only control over the 
sale and distribution of fishing licenses (Michael, 1987). It 
was evident that despite the growing political maturation of 
the territorial government in the post-war years, the contin-
ued lack of legislative and administrative authority would 
prove to be a significant roadblock in Yukon’s political 
development over the latter half of the 20th century.
Even before the truncated fisheries transfer, the fur-
ther devolution of programs to the Yukon government was 
unduly shaped by the prerogatives of the federal govern-
ment. By the late 1960s, with the angry reaction of Abo-
riginal groups to the federal government’s 1969 White 
Paper and the push by the Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development (DIAND) to control the northern 
resource boom that followed on the heels of the Prudhoe 
Bay oil strike in Alaska, the pace of transfers had virtually 
ground to a halt (Clancy, 1990). In the case of the White 
Paper, Canada’s First Nations saw the federal government’s 
proposal to dismantle the Indian Affairs Branch and trans-
fer administration of status Indians to the provinces and ter-
ritories as an “abrogation of its responsibilities that would 
amount to cultural genocide” (Michael, 1987:95). During 
the 1970s, only those programs that did not conflict with 
land claims and other federal priorities were transferred 
to the territorial government: road construction, airports, 
the Northern Canada Power Commission, fishing licenses, 
mine safety, and land titles (Beaubier and Beaubier, 2002). 
The long sought-after ownership and management of nat-
ural resources remained beyond the grasp of territorial 
leaders.
In the 1970s, the territorial debate and pressure on 
Ottawa to transfer land and resources coincided with the 
rise of land-claim negotiations with Yukon’s Aboriginal 
peoples. Yukon politicians in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
argued successfully that it was unfair to give significant 
land ownership to the Aboriginal population without giv-
ing the capacity to the regional (territorial) government to 
manage land and resources throughout the territory. Many 
years of debate followed on what should be transferred 
and in what order (forestry, oil and gas, minerals, land…), 
what the territorial government could handle (capacity of 
the territorial government), and what jurisdictions the fed-
eral government should retain in the name of defending the 
national interest. The frequent turnover of federal ministers 
in DIAND also created setbacks for devolution since it took 
time to brief new ministers before further devolution could 
occur. New ministers often have different perspectives than 
their predecessors, and new governments usually revisit 
and change the programs and legislation of past govern-
ments (S. Smyth, pers. comm. 2010).
 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, federal officials 
made a number of attempts to negotiate sectoral transfers 
to the Yukon territorial government, often in parallel with 
similar negotiations with the Government of the Northwest 
Territories (GNWT). In each territory, some transfers were 
completed, such as forestry to the Northwest Territories in 
1986 and the Canada-Yukon Oil and Gas Accord in 1993. 
However, sectoral negotiations that addressed the issue 
with both territories never resulted in agreements. The sub-
stantial differences between the two territories in political 
imperative and social and political objectives (Cameron and 
White, 1995) meant in all instances that an agreement could 
work for one, but not for both. 
In 1995, Ron Irwin, then Minister of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development, appointed retired lawyer Robert 
Wright to review the devolution file. The Wright Report, 
submitted in April 1995, concluded that for the Northwest 
Territories, devolution should be put on hold until after 
division and creation of the new Nunavut Territory (Wright, 
1995). Regarding Yukon, Wright advocated the bundling of 
remaining resources (land, forestry, minerals, and water) so 
that an overall comprehensive package could be put before 
the Yukon government and a quick negotiation could occur 
to bring about closure on the transfer of remaining “prov-
ince-like” responsibilities. Indeed, Wright’s analysis of sec-
toral transfers in the 1980s and 1990s led him to believe 
that the federal government would end up spending a lot of 
money with few tangible results if it continued with a secto-
ral transfer strategy. Instead, he recommended a more com-
prehensive transfer mainly because he felt that Yukon was 
politically and constitutionally ready and that a package 
deal was more feasible and cost-effective (Wright, 1995). 
Wright seems to have underestimated the complexity of 
the proposed transfer, but the significance of his recommen-
dations should not be understated. In particular, Wright saw 
the importance of bringing to the table all those matters 
that are inextricably linked. It is difficult to address mineral 
jurisdiction, for instance, without linking this discussion to 
where those minerals exist under Yukon land. Most topics 
relating to land management in one way or another inter-
act with the presence of water, usually in the form of lakes 
and rivers or streams that are vital to indigenous fish or 
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anadromous species such as migratory salmon. On a practi-
cal level, “bundling” successfully brought together central 
functions, thus resulting in economies of scale. 
Following the Wright Report in 1995, the federal gov-
ernment extended a “take it or leave it” offer to Yukon 
in January 1997, culminating in the signing of the Yukon 
Devolution Protocol Accord in September 1998. Guided by 
this process document, negotiations between governments 
continued, and consultations with Yukon First Nations 
took place. The latter were required by Section 23.3 of the 
Umbrella Final Agreement, which stipulated that the posi-
tion of the Yukon government in devolution negotiations 
may be developed with the input of the Council of Yukon 
Indians (now the Council of Yukon First Nations, CYFN). 
Once the UFA gave First Nations assurance that further 
devolution would not impede the resolution of outstanding 
land-claim negotiations, Yukon First Nations were gener-
ally supportive of devolution, which they regarded as the 
Yukon government’s land claim (D. Leas, pers. comm. 
2010; Alcantara, 2012). 
The main benefit of devolution for Yukon First Nations 
was that it would be to their advantage to deal with local 
residents, who knew more about local needs and conditions, 
than with the distant federal government (D. Leas, pers. 
comm. 2010; P. McDonald, pers. comm. 2010). Although 
some Yukon First Nations (including the White River First 
Nation, the Ross River Dene Council, and the Liard First 
Nation) did not support the DTA, the fact that most Yukon 
First Nations (through CYFN) were prepared to engage in 
consultations with Yukon and Canada on devolution, can 
be contrasted to the situation in the Northwest Territories, 
where the relationship between the GNWT and Aboriginal 
groups is often strained (S. Smyth, pers. comm. 2010). From 
the perspective of Yukon government negotiators, the sup-
port of a majority of Yukon First Nations with completed 
land claims was a necessary condition to the successful 
pursuit of control and management of natural resources. In 
other words, Yukon government negotiators felt public gov-
ernment in Yukon must be built upon settled land claims 
since the management of natural resources and control of 
Yukon First Nations’ traditional lands are intimately related 
(A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Abercrombie, 
P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010; Alcantara 2012).
Concurrently with its negotiations with the Yukon gov-
ernment, the Government of Canada engaged in a thorough 
review and substantive rewrite of the Yukon Act, the fed-
eral legislation that created the territory in 1898. This Act, 
which is effectively Yukon’s “Constitution,” was amended 
in 2001 to allow the Yukon government to legislate and thus 
to manage its land and resources. In addition to these juris-
dictions, the amended Act captured principles of respon-
sible government, which included removing the federal 
Minister’s power to override territorial authority. There was 
also a strong desire on the part of the Yukon government 
to modernize the language of the Act to reflect the princi-
ples of the Epp Letter since the existing legislation made it 
appear as if the federally appointed Commissioner was still 
in charge of territorial affairs (P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). 
Combined with the implementation of the Canada-Yukon 
Oil and Gas Accord (YOGA) and DTA, the new Yukon Act 
brought Yukon to “all but” provincial status. 
Despite the support of the CYFN, the Yukon government 
still had to resolve several major issues with the federal 
government before a devolution transfer agreement could 
be reached. In particular, the Yukon government was appre-
hensive that the federal government would “claw back” any 
revenues generated by new resource development projects 
from the Territorial Financing Formula (TFF). The solution 
for the territorial government was to retain the first $3 mil-
lion generated by resource development projects, at which 
point the TFF would be reduced on a dollar-per-dollar basis. 
Although some Yukoners believe the $3 million figure is 
too low, the premier at the time defended the provision, say-
ing that financial aspects of such agreements are in a nearly 
constant state of negotiation and can be increased at a later 
date (P. McDonald, pers. comm. 2010). The debate may 
be moot since, to date, no resource development project in 
Yukon has hit the $3 million cap (J. Cunning, pers. comm. 
2010). However, with the current surge in mining explora-
tion and mine development in Yukon, this figure is now a 
topic of serious discussion between the federal and Yukon 
governments and a major issue that all parties addressed in 
the 2011 Yukon general election. 
Another major sticking point in negotiations was the 
financial liability of development projects approved by the 
federal government prior to the DTA. An oft-cited exam-
ple is the Faro Mine, which will cost Canada well more 
than $500-million to remediate and close the site. With the 
Yukon government unable, not to mention unwilling, to pay 
this amount, the settlement eventually reached by the fed-
eral and territorial governments was that liability for any 
projects approved prior to the DTA would be the respon-
sibility of the federal government, while any projects 
approved by the Yukon government after devolution would 
be a territorial responsibility. This settlement was a cal-
culated risk on the part of the Yukon government because 
of its much smaller tax base and increased costs related 
to support services such as firefighting (P. McDonald, 
pers. comm. 2010), especially if a development the territo-
rial government approves requires extensive remediation 
(A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Abercrombie, 
P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). Nevertheless, this settlement 
appears to have worked out to the advantage of the Yukon 
government since federal funds for the remediation of sites 
like the Faro Mine amount to a blank cheque rather than a 
lump sum (A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Aber-
crombie, P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). 
Despite a range of challenges faced in the negotiation 
of the transfer of associated federal bureaucrats to Yukon, 
most federal civil servants seemed to look forward to the 
transfer of the NAP. On one hand, they would have better 
access to decision makers and greater ministerial account-
ability (J. O’Farrell, pers. comm. 2010). Prior to that point, a 
federal employee could “work in the territory for ten years 
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and never see their Minister” (S. Smyth, pers. comm. 2010). 
On the other hand, the relationship between DIAND’s 
Regional Office in Whitehorse and headquarters in Ottawa 
had become strained. While it was easy for the Minister 
and other officials in Ottawa to duck and hide from inquir-
ies and complaints, Yukon civil servants had nowhere to 
hide from applicants who had no qualms about coming 
right to their offices (B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010). For 
instance, after the federal government reneged on a Timber 
Harvest Agreement in Watson Lake, leading to successful 
litigation against DIAND, logging trucks circled govern-
ment buildings in Whitehorse, impeding government offi-
cials’ access to their offices (J. Cunning, pers. comm. 
2010). Regional bureaucrats also resented being “chewed 
out” by the Minister’s Office about phone calls Yukoners 
would regularly place to Ottawa to express their displeas-
ure with the regulatory process, especially when Yukon had 
powerful MPs in Ottawa like Deputy Prime Minister Erik 
Neilson. Also, DIAND field officials in Yukon requesting 
increased funding for areas such as fire suppression would 
be frustrated by central departments such as Finance and 
the Treasury Board, which seemed to not understand why 
the Canadian government should be paying for programs 
that were not normally federal responsibilities (A. Robert-
son, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Abercrombie, P. Muir, pers. 
comm. 2010).
From a legal perspective, the DTA was a complicated 
agreement. While there is a common perception that the 
transition from federal to territorial control of the NAP 
was “seamless,” a lot of legal work was done behind the 
scenes to integrate existing federal legislation into the new 
legal regime taking effect after 2003 (P. Muir, pers. comm. 
2010). The complexity of the DTA required extensive con-
sultations with numerous federal agencies, including the 
Privy Council Office, the Department of Justice, the Pri-
vacy Commissioner, the National Archives, the Language 
Commissioner, the Treasury Board, and the Department of 
Finance. 
The DTA was a “blueprint” for the transfer of respon-
sibilities from the federal to the territorial government, 
which meant that the territorial government still had to pass 
“mirror legislation” to cover areas of responsibility for-
merly administered by the federal government (J. O’Farrell, 
pers. comm. 2010). The problem is that the mirror legisla-
tion that came into effect after the passage of the DTA was 
antiquated, much like the Yukon Act discussed earlier. 
The Quartz Mining Act (QMA), for example, had not been 
amended since 1924. The antiquity of the legislation was 
of considerable concern to many in the mining industry 
as well as to other territorial groups such as environmen-
tal interests. In addition the mining industry was concerned 
that, following transfer, the Yukon government would allow 
other parties to be involved in the claim renewal process. 
This concern was assuaged once it was impressed upon the 
mining community that the renewal process would essen-
tially remain unchanged after the transfer of the NAP to the 
Yukon government (P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). Despite 
these challenges, including similar problems relating to 
water management, Yukon government negotiators decided 
it was best to first gain legislative control through mirror 
territorial legislation “with all its warts” since devolution 
could not occur without it (P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). With 
the legislative jurisdiction in the hands of the Government 
of Yukon, it would be possible to address those “warts” 
over time through amendments in the Yukon Legislature. 
Having overcome these challenges, the Government 
of Canada and the Yukon government reached the Yukon 
Northern Affairs Program Devolution Transfer Agree-
ment on 29 October 2001. This agreement came into 
effect in 2003, 10 years after the signing of the Umbrella 
Final Agreement between the Council of Yukon Indians, 
the Government of Canada, and the Yukon government in 
1993. Here we see the federal government pursuing a pro-
gram of legislative and administrative decentralization 
with two different but interrelated groups of stakeholders 
in the same political jurisdiction at roughly the same time. 
According to some interviewees, the position of the fed-
eral government demonstrates a “genuine commitment” to 
political and economic development in Yukon (A. Robert-
son, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Abercrombie, P. Muir, pers. 
comm. 2010). Moreover, the federal government wanted to 
“reduce the bloated DIAND bureaucracy and to get out of 
the natural resources game” (A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, 
B. Love, S. Abercrombie, P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). The 
federal government had essentially become the provincial 
government of Yukon but was ill-suited to running “provin-
cial” programs and had become fatigued by the responsi-
bility (P. McDonald, pers. comm. 2010). For instance, the 
federal government was in a constant state of irritation 
regarding opposition to its one-sided policy decisions, par-
ticularly as they related to land-use decisions in the forestry 
and mining sectors (P. McDonald, pers. comm. 2010). 
Meanwhile, the Yukon government was eager to “get in” 
to service delivery and especially resource management 
(J. O’Farrell, pers. comm. 2010). For Yukon’s political lead-
ers, continued federal control over resources and the federal 
government’s “faceless and unresponsive” approval process 
were untenable (P. McDonald, pers. comm. 2010). From 
the perspective of most members of the CYFN, “the more 
power the Yukon government gets, the more power the 
CYFN gets” (D. Leas, pers. comm. 2010). For the CYFN, 
local accountability meant greater capacity for Yukon First 
Nations to influence the use and management of the nearly 
90% of their traditional territory not covered by final agree-
ments (D. Leas, pers. comm. 2010).
In 2008, five years after the implementation of the DTA, 
the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development 
commissioned Neil McCrank, an Alberta lawyer and for-
mer senior provincial bureaucrat, to write a report enti-
tled “Road to Improvement: The Review of the Regulatory 
Systems Across the North.” A common theme in discus-
sions and workshops held by Mr. McCrank is that devolu-
tion has provided an additional layer of accountability by 
clarifying to industry stakeholders who is responsible for 
334 • C. ALCANTARA et al.
the regulatory process in Yukon (McCrank, 2008). He also 
noted that the UFA has made the Yukon resource manage-
ment environment less complex than those in Nunavut and 
especially the Northwest Territories. 
It is important to note, however, that McCrank openly 
admitted to focusing on the Northwest Territories and con-
ducting only a “cursory” review of Yukon’s regulatory 
and resource management regime. McCrank (2008:96) 
stated: “I did visit Yukon and Nunavut, but did not spend 
an extensive amount of time there, partly because what I 
observed over the short time I was there and what I’ve 
heard is that the system seems to be working reasonably 
well.” As mentioned earlier, findings such as those pre-
sented in McCrank’s report have gone largely untested. No 
one, it appears, has tried to measure the effectiveness and 
responsiveness of the transfer of the NAP to the Yukon gov-
ernment and the inclusion of the First Nations in resource 
management.
ASSESSING DEVOLUTION:
EFFICIENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
In this section, we focus specifically on the permitting 
processes for land use and mining before and after the 
Devolution Transfer Agreement. Unfortunately, a statistical 
analysis of the number of land-use and mining permit appli-
cations processed in the decade before and after the DTA 
and the average amount of time taken to adjudicate such 
applications is not possible. Government officials informed 
us that the data necessary for such an analysis were either 
lost or never recorded, and our search of government 
records in Whitehorse and Ottawa confirms this fact. Con-
sequently, the following section relies mostly on interviews 
with territorial, Aboriginal, and industry officials regarding 
the effect of devolution on the land-use and mining permit 
processes in Yukon. Despite this limitation, study partici-
pants were able to shed some light on the system of natural 
resource management that existed prior and subsequent to 
the YOGA in 1998 and the DTA in 2003, and the outcome 
of these legislative and administrative changes. Overall, all 
16 of our interviewees reported that devolution has gener-
ally had a positive effect on the process and outcomes relat-
ing to land-use and mineral permits in the territory.
While the YOGA was certainly a historical political 
achievement for the Yukon government, the bulk of the 
analysis that follows will focus on the impact of the DTA 
on Yukon’s land-use permitting process, given the weight 
of current pressures on land use and particularly land use 
associated with mineral exploration and development. It is 
also worth considering that the Yukon government’s inclu-
sion of First Nations in oil and gas negotiations forged a 
positive working relationship between the two groups and 
made it easier for that government to secure the support of 
the CYFN while negotiating the transfer of the Northern 
Affairs Program (D. Leas, pers. comm. 2010; A. Robert-
son, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Abercrombie, P. Muir, pers. 
comm. 2010). For example, the Yukon government and 
CYFN negotiated a Memorandum of Agreement that gave 
the latter group veto power over oil and gas projects on 
their settlement lands and ensured that no oil and gas devel-
opments would be permitted on First Nations traditional 
lands not covered by a land-claim settlement (D. Leas, pers. 
comm. 2010).
Focusing on the land-use permitting process in the 
Yukon, it is important to distinguish between land-use per-
mits and land dispositions. Land-use permits are short-term 
access agreements granted for activities such as winter 
access, mining camps, and construction. Land dispositions, 
of which there are three types, represent long-term land-
use arrangements. The first type of land disposition is the 
license of occupation, which allows applicants to occupy 
the land but does not grant them any rights to that land. The 
second is the lease, which gives applicants more permanent 
and exclusive use of the surface lands. Finally, title gives 
applicants ownership of the land and full surface rights. 
Subsurface use and rights must be obtained through a Min-
ing Land Use Permit, granted pursuant to the Mining Land 
Use Regulations Act and associated regulations. Placer 
mining is covered by separate legislation and is not part of 
this study.
Prior to the enactment of the DTA in 2003, the majority 
of land in the territory was controlled by the federal Ter-
ritorial Lands Act. The Yukon government controlled only 
small portions of land in and around incorporated commu-
nities such as Whitehorse and Dawson City. Before 2003, 
applications for general and mining land use were assessed 
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 
(CEAA), with DIAND responsible for doing environmental 
assessments triggered by particular land-use and resource 
development applications (B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010). 
The result of the “self-assessments” conducted by the fed-
eral government was that the land-use permitting process 
was highly integrated, and timelines for approval were con-
densed (B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010). 
During that time, mining land-use regulations required 
a decision to be made within 42 days of an application 
although department policy was for applications to be sent 
out for comments and consultation and returned within 21 
days (J. Colbert, B. Sproule, M. White, pers. comm. 2010). 
CEAA did not have any timelines. In practice, any inter-
ested party could provide feedback on a land-use per-
mit application and groups that were consulted generally 
included Environment Canada, the Water Board, the Yukon 
government, and affected First Nations (J. Colbert, B. 
Sproule, M. White, pers. comm. 2010). Yukon First Nations, 
however, alleged public consultation under the “old” system 
was not extensive or responsive enough to local Aborigi-
nal and territorial concerns, especially since the Act failed 
to specify how the required consultation was to take place 
(B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010; J. Colbert, B. Sproule, 
M. White, pers. comm. 2010). 
Yukoners were also constantly aggrieved by the Fed-
eral-Territorial Land Application Committee (FTLAC), 
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the body responsible for adjudicating land dispositions. 
Although the experts and federal government officials that 
composed FTLAC generally rendered decisions within 
three to six months, it was not uncommon for several years 
to pass before decisions were made. Applications for cot-
tage lands, for instance, were particularly notorious for lan-
guishing before FTLAC. Even the territorial government 
had to endure protracted land disposition applications that 
required federal ministerial review and a federal Order-in-
Council (B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010). 
Most of the reasons why land dispositions took so long to 
adjudicate relate to the fact that the decision-making power 
was located in Ottawa rather than Whitehorse. One factor 
was the remoteness of federal officials in Ottawa. Another 
factor was the number of required federal interdepartmental 
consultations. Since decisions required high-level involve-
ment from the federal government’s Department of Justice, 
Treasury Board, Department of Finance, and Privy Coun-
cil Office, it took “years and years” for things to get done 
compared to post-devolution (B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 
2010). Other reasons likely included the uncertainty related 
to the completion of outstanding land claims (D. Leas, 
pers. comm. 2010; A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, B. Love, 
S. Abercrombie, P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010); insufficient 
clarity from the Courts on the extent to which consulta-
tion was required; lack of CEAA timelines; and compet-
ing land-use issues. The very first day the administration 
of land use and mineral development was devolved to the 
territorial government, there was a “mad rush” of people to 
the Yukon government offices, and it took territorial civil 
servants three years to clear the backlog of applications that 
had accumulated under DIAND’s watch (B. McIntyre, pers. 
comm. 2010).
For the first two years after the passage of the DTA in 
2003, land-use permits and land disposition applications 
were reviewed under the territorial Yukon Environmental 
Assessment Act (YEAA), the mirror legislation to the fed-
eral CEAA. Former federal employees treated the old and 
new Acts in much the same way, with decisions generally 
being made within four months (J. Colbert, B. Sproule, M. 
White, pers. comm. 2010). The timeframe for applications 
to be adjudicated was largely similar under CEAA and 
YEAA (B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010).
For all intents and purposes, the assessment environ-
ments under CEAA and YEAA were identical. It was not 
until the enactment of the Yukon Environmental and Socio-
Economic Assessment Act (YESAA) in 2005 that Yukon’s 
land use and resource development application process 
began to undergo significant changes. YESAA is the federal 
legislation that replaced YEAA and was enacted in fulfill-
ment of obligations under chapter 12 of the Umbrella Final 
Agreement, signed by the Council of Yukon First Nations 
and the federal and territorial governments. The signifi-
cance of YESAA is three-fold. First, the Act eliminated 
the environmental self-assessment model found in CEAA 
and YEAA by taking away the environmental assessment 
function from the core regulator, DIAND under CEAA and 
Yukon government under the brief life of YEAA. Second, 
the Act added socio-economic assessment in its own right, 
independent of the environmental impacts, to the over-
all assessment process. In addition, YESAA ensures that 
a proponent fully considers potential environmental and 
socio-economic impacts and required mitigation before the 
regulators (federal, territorial or First Nation) are legally 
able to approve and license a development. 
The new functions introduced by YESAA became the 
responsibility of the Yukon Environmental and Socio- 
Economic Assessment Board (YESAB). YESAB is a sin-
gle, independent environmental and socio-economic 
assessment body created under the authority of the federal 
Act. YESAB comprises representatives from Yukon First 
Nations, the Government of Canada, and the Yukon gov-
ernment and is responsible for applications from across the 
entire territory, whether these relate to federal, territorial, 
First Nation, or municipal lands. All new projects require a 
YESAA assessment if activities are triggered by particular 
resource development projects as described in associated 
regulations. Thus, the introduction of YESAA in 2005 ush-
ered in a “new” two-step application process for land-use 
and resource development permits, with YESAB responsi-
ble for conducting the environmental and socio-economic 
assessments. Ultimate authority to “accept, reject or vary” 
the assessment recommendations rests with the federal, ter-
ritorial, and First Nations governments, as does responsibil-
ity for regulatory decision making and licensing following 
the assessment. 
The context under which YESAB operates can be con-
trasted to that of the Northwest Territories, where separate 
land claims have led to several different environmental 
assessment boards with real decision-making authority and 
different assessment regimes (K. McKinnon, pers. comm. 
2010). Conversely, YESAB is neither a regulatory nor 
quasi-judicial body but makes recommendations to what 
are referred to in the YESAA as “decision bodies.” Depend-
ing on the nature of the “trigger” that requires the assess-
ment to be conducted, recommendations from YESAB are 
sent to one or more of the following decision bodies: First 
Nations, if the project in question is on First Nation settle-
ment lands under a modern treaty; the Yukon government 
acting as one integrated body; or any federal government 
department or agency whose jurisdiction is affected by rec-
ommendations from YESAB, such as the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans if there are potential implications for 
anadromous fish or any fish habitat. 
In the case of mineral exploration and development, 
the Yukon government is the formal decision body, and its 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR) takes 
the lead role. Such decision bodies issue what are known 
as “decision documents,” which can accept, reject, or vary 
a YESAB recommendation. Applications may be rejected 
because of the impact proposed developments might have 
on the environment, especially wildlife and habitat. Denied 
applications cannot be appealed, but they can be resub-
mitted with necessary changes. In most cases, the Yukon 
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government allows projects to proceed with conditions 
that reflect the YESAB recommendations in the decision 
document. The government may also include in a decision 
document any other matter that the EMR (as the techni-
cal lead) believes requires care and attention by the pro-
ponent, such as matters captured in regulation that are not 
part of the environmental and socio-economic assessment 
(B. McIntyre, pers. comm. 2010).
Since its inception in 2005, YESAB has conducted 
1076 environmental assessments and frequently completes 
assessments ahead of the maximum timelines established 
under the YESAA legislation (K. McKinnon, pers. comm. 
2010). Between 1 January 2005 and 4 November 2010, the 
average time between the submission of proposals and the 
sending of recommendations was 55.44 days. During that 
time, YESAB conducted 238 environmental assessments 
for the placer mining sector, which accounted for the high-
est percentage (23%) of all land use applicants. YESAB also 
completed 212 environmental assessments for residential, 
commercial, and industrial land development (20%) and 
137 environmental assessments for quartz mining propo-
nents (13%), the next highest sectors. Residential, commer-
cial, and industrial development was the fastest of the three 
sectors to be approved, at an average of 54.31 days, slightly 
ahead of placer mining (57.2 days) and quartz mining (61.2 
days). Although comparative data for permits adjudicated 
before 2005 are unavailable, the president of YESAB stated 
that the number of environmental assessments completed 
after the introduction of YESAB is significantly higher than 
before 2005 (K. McKinnon, pers. comm. 2010).
Since 2005, Yukon has been described as one of the 
world’s best mining jurisdictions because of its very sta-
ble political climate, good transportation and energy infra-
structure, and demonstrably pro-mining government. 
These characterizations are supported by the Fraser Insti-
tute’s annual mining survey (Cervantes and McMahon, 
2011), which regularly places post-devolution Yukon near 
the top of its Policy Potential Index for best mining jurisdic-
tions within Canada and around the world. Although these 
results can probably be attributed at least in part to world 
economic factors, the Yukon mining industry expanded at 
an annual average rate of 10.5% between 2003 and 2008. 
This figure far exceeds the 3.1% growth of all other indus-
tries, with mineral exploration spending in 2010 forecast to 
match the 2007 record of $140-million (see Dashkov, 2010). 
Also, it is worth noting that Manitoba and Yukon were the 
only Canadian jurisdictions to experience positive GDP 
growth in 2010 because of mining activity (G. Komaromi, 
pers. comm. 2010).
From the perspective of the mining industry, the 
Umbrella Final Agreement has created greater “certainty” 
regarding land claims, since 11 of 14 Yukon First Nations 
have endorsed the agreement, while YESAA’s strict time-
lines have created greater “certainty and efficiency” 
(M. Wark, pers. comm. 2010). In addition, the Yukon gov-
ernment has borne many of the costs associated with 
mining activities, such as housing and healthcare, using 
funds received from its tax base and federal transfers (P. 
McDonald, pers. comm. 2010). The mapping and surveying 
done by the Yukon government has also fostered the min-
ing industry in the territory (M. Wark, pers. comm. 2010).
CONCLUSION
In 2003, a number of prominent Yukoners spoke with 
great optimism about devolution. Scott Casselman, then 
vice-president of the Yukon Chambers of Mines, embraced 
the agreement, saying that it would allow those who were 
directly involved and knowledgeable about mining in the 
territory to have a greater say and thus produce more effi-
cient and responsive mining outcomes in the territory. 
Leonard Pierson of the Yukon Forest Industry Associa-
tion agreed, observing that “we’ve had a long and difficult 
journey with the previous DIAND forestry program. We’re 
certainly looking forward to a more accommodating and 
directly involved group of government people there [post-
devolution].” Karen Baltgailis of the Yukon Conservation 
Society echoed these hopes, stating that “now we’ll just be 
able to make those decisions in the Yukon and we won’t 
have to wait for Ottawa to let that process happen” (CBC, 
2003). The data presented in this paper confirm these opti-
mistic sentiments, indicating that devolution has made the 
land-use and mining permit processes more responsive and 
effective. The findings are also consistent with the gener-
ally positive perceptions of devolution, as reported in the 
latter half of the history section. In short, Yukon’s experi-
ences with devolution confirm some of the arguments made 
in the literature regarding devolution in Canada and abroad. 
The Auditor General of Canada stated in 2003 that 
Yukon devolution was “a historic event that marked a sig-
nificant step in nation building” (Canada, 2003:17). For 
those most intimately involved in the negotiations, the 
YOGA, DTA, and amended Yukon Act were a “natural evo-
lution” of the Epp letter in 1979 and the Northern Economic 
Framework of 1987 (A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, B. Love, 
S. Abercrombie, P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). From the per-
spective of the CYFN, the Yukon government secured a 
fair deal that coincided with the winding down of the land-
claim process (D. Leas, pers. comm. 2010). Despite some 
lingering dissatisfaction, Yukon’s political parties have lim-
ited themselves to debate over specific aspects of the agree-
ment rather than questioning the legitimacy of the entire 
agreement (A. Robertson, G. Komaromi, B. Love, S. Aber-
crombie, P. Muir, pers. comm. 2010). In many ways, the 
confluence of the political maturation of the Government of 
Yukon, the insistence and growing political sophistication 
of Yukon First Nations, and shifting attitudes and priori-
ties of the federal government and its departments, espe-
cially DIAND, have made it possible for Yukon to shed its 
colonial past and solidify its position within the Canadian 
federation.
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